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Abstract 
Agriculture is at the centre of the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations, with the United States 
refusing up to now any compromise in GATT in the absence of an agreement on agricultural policy 
reform. At the same time, the European Community has started to reorient its Common Agricultural 
Policy. After difficult negotiations between Member States, the philosophy of the CAP was profoundly 
changed last May. Focusing on cereals, the reform sharply reduces support prices and replaces them 
with budget support. A minimal compromise in GATT thus becomes probable, since the United States 
may adopt a less intransigent stance than at the beginning of the current round of negotiations, its 
commercial interests being centred on the major crops and largely satisfied, in terms of cereals, through 
the Community initiative. 
 
Although agriculture plays an unprecedented role in the current round of multilateral GATT 
negotiations, the Uruguay Round, from its launch in 1986 in Punta del Este to date, seems to follow a 
familiar scenario: ambitious statement of intent on the need for greater liberalisation of trade in 
agricultural products and a rapid deterioration of the debate in a clash between the United States and 
the European Economic Community (EEC). The novelty lies in the almost universal recognition that it is 
urgent to reform not only agricultural trade policies but also domestic support policies, and in 
abandoning the reference to the special status that had allowed legitimate derogations from the general 
GATT rules (waiver in the United States, variable levies and refunds in the EEC, etc.). The novelty also 
comes from the fact that, to date, the United States, the countries of the Cairns Group and developing 
countries still refuse any compromise on the various issues (goods, services, intellectual property, etc.) 
in the absence of an agreement on agricultural policy reform. 
The agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round tend to be reduced to an opposition between the 
United States and the EEC. The United States emphasises the need for reform of all agricultural policies 
and for specific commitments for import access, export competition and domestic support policies. The 
EEC adopts a more stance defensive, accepts a ‘certain’ decline in international support, asserts that the 
latter will automatically result in a reduction in export subsidies without the need for additional 
commitments on this point. This opposition is not new, and characterises the rounds of negotiations 
after the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Dillon Round in 1961-62, Kennedy Round in 
1964-67 and the Tokyo Round in 1973-79. The United States has always adopted a maximalist position 
in the early stages of these rounds, finally accepting a more limited agreement and the postponement to 
the next cycle of a real reform of agricultural policies. The scenario of the current cycle is therefore 
similar to that of rounds previous, at least until today. Will history repeat itself, with the United States 
adopting a more uncompromising position and accepting a minimal compromise, as solutions to 
fundamental problems are once again postponed for the future? An examination of the fundamental 
facts of the issues at stake and the most recent proposals of the United States would lead to such an 
outcome of the negotiations. 
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Nevertheless, the new fact is the recognition by the Member States of the Community that a reform of 
the CAP can no longer be avoided. The support of domestic prices at levels significantly higher than 
world prices, is indeed difficult to justify economically, in the medium and long term. Constantly 
postponed, this necessary reform of the CAP has been on the agenda since at least 1968 (Mansholt 
Plan). The various measures adopted over the past ten years have not called into question the 
functioning Organisations of the Common Market(CMOs), with the exception, however, of the milk CMO 
regulated by a production quota since April 1984 and, in to a lesser extent, fiscal stabilisers introduced in 
1988 for grains and oilseeds. Their primary objective was to curb the growth of agricultural expenditure, 
but because they did not call into question the basic principles of the CAP and in particular the support 
of market prices, they did not make it possible to improve their functioning in a sustainable way. 
Although it has some points in common with previous proposals or measures, such as the withdrawal of 
productive resources, the CAP reform compromise, adopted by the Member States on the occasion of 
the Council of the European Communities from 18 to21 May, 1992, differs markedly in its overall 
coherence, whereas the previous reforms mainly resorted to expedients peculiar to this or that 
production. It implies a profound support of modalities, since direct aid to production factors largely 
replace aid for products. It does not respond to the logic of budgetary savings, even if it remains decisive 
in a long-term perspective, because it aims to obtain positive effects on demand domestic. It 
emphasises the need for market forces to play a greater role, while trying to integrate the constraints of 
environmental preservation, rural and regional development, and the international agricultural context. 
Although the Commission has always stated, at least officially, that CAP reform and GATT negotiations 
are two separate issues, the CAP reform, adopted outside the GATT framework, must nevertheless be 
interpreted in the light of the positions of the Contracting Parties of the Uruguay Round, and in 
particular in the light of those of the Community and the United States. This reading of the reform 
makes it possible to analyse to what extent the latter is consistent with the negotiating positions of the 
Community in the GATT and to what extent it meets the American requirements. It helps to understand 
how the reform responds to both internal needs for change in the CAP and external pressures, amplified 
and coordinated in the Uruguay Round. The reform thus appears as a real initiative and not a passive 
reaction to these pressures. 
Examination of its contents in relation to the most recent compromise put on the negotiating table 
(‘Dunkel’ compromise of December 1991), will show that it satisfies certain points but not others. Thus 
the EEC obliges, by a strategy of movement, the other negotiators to position themselves in relation to 
its form whose modalities go beyond the commercial logic of the GATT. The EEC is thus taking a step in 
the direction of the compromise, without however submitting to it, which makes it possible to seriously 
consider an agreement that is forthcoming but much less ambitious than the initial declaration of the 
current round of negotiations. At the same time, the fundamental data are still present and provide a 
better understanding of the pressures that will continue to be exerted in the coming years on the 
sectors that are hardly concerned by the current reform. 
We will first recall the logic of the negotiating positions of the two main players in the Uruguay Round, 
the United States and the EEC, before assessing the impact of the reform, based on scenarios for the 
1996 horizon. We will discuss the scope of the reform at the community, French and international levels.  
The first American proposal in the Uruguay Round, or ‘zero option’, was put on the negotiating table in 
1987, aimed at a complete elimination of support for agriculture by the year 2000. It was immediately 
rejected by the EEC because it led to a dismantling of the basic principles of the CAP: high domestic 
prices disconnected from World prices and levies and variable refunds system. The EEC proposed, in 
response, to adopt a two-step process: short-term actions to stabilise the most unbalanced markets and 
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prevent these imbalances from becoming worse; and reductions in longer-term support levels, 
measured using the Global Measurement of Support indicator. 
The proposals of these two actors evolved in the direction of a ‘certain’ rapprochement; they remain 
nevertheless, quite distinct because each of them is inspired always by the same logic as at the 
beginning of the cycle: simultaneous commitments on all policies for the United States, commitment to 
the sole reduction of domestic support and refusal of a specific prohibition of export aid for the 
Community. The permanence of these positions of principle explains the impossibility of finding a 
compromise acceptable to both contracting parties. It also explains the favourable reception by the 
United States of the various compromises, especially the latest Dunkel compromise, which gave pride of 
place to American positions, and their refusal by the Community. 
A detailed examination of the economic and political bases of the positions of the two actors then 
makes it possible to better understand their proposals, to identify the main points of disagreement and 
to the outline contours of a possible compromise. The major concern of the United States is to mitigate, 
and if possible reverse, the negative consequences of the CAP on trade in grain and animal feed 
ingredients, the main US export interests. 
The United States never really accepted the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy, mainly 
because a high level of Community  protection on cereals meant a reduction in this market. They have 
always considered the Community mechanism of variable levies and refunds as contrary to GATT rules. 
They also sought preferential access to the Community market (unsuccessful during the first 
enlargement of the EEC, but successfully with the entry of Spain and Portugal). US commercial interests 
in meal protein and corn byproducts are also closely linked to the Community grain policy. These 
products are exempt from import duties on entry into the Community. These exemptions represent 
earlier concessions made by the EEC under the GATT which, at the time of their signatures, did not 
appear to be important but, over time, have had far-reaching consequences. The gap between domestic 
prices of cereals and world prices of other ingredients in animal feed has indeed favoured substitution 
between these two types of products in feeds. In addition, the persistence of this gap has also 
influenced the evolution of animal feeding techniques, by promoting the use of protein meal and by-
products, and by negatively affecting trends in the use of cereals for animal nutrition and positively 
those of imported products. Thus, from 1984/85 to 1990/91, the share of cereals in animal diets 
decreased from 56.9 to 49.0%, that of meal protein increased from 15.0 to 19.0%, and that of corn 
gluten feed increased from 3.0 to 4.1% [Agra Europe, 1 November 1991]. The importance of the 
Community market and the desire to maintain the pressure on C MO Cereals explain the United States' 
constant refusal to harmonise Community protection on these products, either by taxation or by setting 
import quotas.  They also explain the US concern to limit the development of the EU oilseed sector. This 
could only be achieved at the cost of a considerable increase in expenditure (ECU 3.4 billion in 1990). 
This aid system was the subject of an unfavourable Community arbitration by a panel of the GATT at the 
end of 1989. 
Even if there is in the United States, at least in some circles, a desire to reform more their own  
agricultural policy generally in the current negotiations, their commercial interests and comparative 
advantages over grains and oil seeds explain their commitment to separate import access policies, 
export competition and domestic support. This concern is still reflected in the latest US proposal.  
The Community's defensive attitude to the GATT is driven more by internal concerns -correcting the 
consequences of past agricultural policy decisions - than by commercial interests. Measures taken since 
1984 (introduction of milk quotas in April), and especially since the Summit of Brussels February 1988 
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(restrictive price policy, co-responsibility taxes applied to cereals and milk, mechanism of the Budget 
Stabilisers based on Maximum Quantities Guarantees for cereals and oilseed crops, etc.), have the 
primary objective of curbing growth in the spending budget. The Community's proposals seek therefore 
to preserve the principles of the CAP and, to correct if possible, some of the perverse effects of 
concessions made in previous rounds. 
The EEC has always considered that the CAP was not negotiable and rejected the principle of separate 
negotiations on export competition policies, access to imports and domestic support. In particular, as 
the mechanism of levies and variable refunds is a logical consequence of domestic policies, the 
reduction of domestic support will have to automatically reduce protection and export subsidies. As a 
result, the EEC agreed to negotiate the reduction of domestic support, as measured by the Global 
Support Measure, but rejected the principle of specific commitments on export subsidies. The pricing 
advocated by the United States was also rejected, again because it implied a challenge to the 
mechanism of variable levies. The Community then proposed a ‘different pricing procedure’ with 
maintaining a certain variability of protection and rebalancing on products for which the Community 
considered protection too weak. The tariffs advocated by the Community clearly illustrate its concern 
not to call into question the foundations of the CAP and to correct the negative effects of previous 
decisions. In fact, the management costs of the cereals markets and oilseed crops largely explain the 
Community's desire to ‘complete’ the Common Agricultural Policy on the different ingredients of animal 
feed. Attempts to introduce a tax on oils and vegetable fats were unsuccessful. This objective was 
quickly replaced by that of a harmonisation of the protection, the reduction of support then appearing 
as a concession to the taxation of these imports. 
The Community position during the Uruguay Round is, moreover, consistent with that adopted in 
previous cycles, and particularly during the Kennedy Round, when the Community wanted the various 
contracting parties to agree to negotiate a ‘certain’ reduction in the ‘amount of support’. The United 
States had rejected this offer, considering that it allowed the EEC to legitimise the mechanism of 
variable levies and restitutions and to maintain a high level of protection. The US interest would 
undoubtedly have been to adopt a more flexible attitude by agreeing to negotiate the reduction of the 
amount of support, which would at least have made it possible to constrain the further developments of 
the CAP. The logic of the Community position is reflected in its proposal November 1990. 
The Community refusal of compromises in the GATT The points of disagreement between the two main 
negotiating are therefore still parties very numerous today, neither of them having accepted to make, 
pursued, United States, of policy internal for the EEC. The Ministerial Conference in Brussels from 3 to 7 
December 1990, which was supposed to close the eighth round of the GATT negotiations, ended in 
failure, despite the final attempt of the Swedish Minister of Agriculture, Mat Hellstrom. The Community 
rejected the Hellstrom compromise, which, in its view, was too close to the US theses by explicitly 
recognising the need for specific commitments in the three areas of domestic support, subsidies export 
and access to imports. 
The GATT negotiations were still deadlocked at the end of 1991. The United States had certainly 
adopted a less intransigent stance, accepting for example a reduction in export subsidies limited to 35% 
[Agra Europe, 6 December 1991]. The Commission of the European Communities, for its part, and 
despite the protest of several Member States (France in particular), admitted in February 1991 the 
principle of binding commitments specific on three aspects of the negotiation. Nevertheless, the United 
States and the EEC remained divided on pricing, rebalancing, the reduction of export subsidies, the 
classification of support measures in the various tolerance categories, the inclusion of credit for 
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measures taken unilaterally since the beginning of the cycle, and the maintenance of unilateral 
retaliatory measures by the United States (Section 301 of the Trade Act).  
GATT Secretary-General Arthur Dunkel, acting as Chairman of the Trade Negotiations Group, was 
supposed to close the talks by the spring of 1992.  We know that this was not the case, since the Dunkel 
compromise was rejected earlier on 23 December 1991 by the Council of Ministers of the Community as 
it was, like the previous ones, considered to be a fine balance in favour of US theses. This text is, 
however, the basic document of the current discussions. It clearly shows that the measures envisaged 
correspond to a significant weakening of the ambitious ministerial declaration of Punta del Este, which is 
far from the initial objective which was ‘the completion of greater trade liberalisation’. However, it 
opens the way to a minimum agreement, as the CAP reform partly meets the proposed commitments. 
The Community's desire to reform the Common Agricultural Policy, outside the framework of the GATT 
and without waiting for the outcome of the cycle to be known, is indeed the major event that has 
changed the game of negotiation by allowing the Community to take the initiative for the first time since 
1986. 
The Community initiative for the reform of the CAP deficit in most agricultural products at the time of its 
creation, the EEC quickly reached, then passed, self-sufficiency in temperate zone products thus 
ensuring the security of its supplies, that is to say one of the initial objectives of the Treaty of Rome 
(Article 39). The mechanisms set up in a net import regime, which are part of a policy of import 
substitution, that could be reformed in time to handle a situation of growing structural surplus, 
highlighting a number of perverse effects at the level and hierarchy of community prices (Demarty , 
Delache and Deroin-Thévenin , Leon and Mahé , Burrel, Buckwell , Guyomard and Mahé ). the 
Commission also recognised the urgent need for reform, based on the following observation - 
guarantees existing prices, directly related to production, lead therefore to an increase production -the 
only way to absorb the additional production would be to increase intervention stocks - already 
overcrowded - or export to world markets already oversupplied -current mechanisms necessarily serve 
to incite increases re intensity and volume of production, leading to increased risks to the environment; 
- the rapid increase in budgetary expenditure, which largely benefits a small minority of farms, does not 
solve the inherent problems in agricultural income in general. In light of this analysis, the Commission 
proposed, first in February 1991, then in July of the same year, objectives and guidelines for the future 
Common Agricultural Policy, and far from suppressing intervention and liberalising agricultural markets, 
the project was definitely opening a new era in the design of agricultural intervention in the Community, 
in particular by means of a reorientation of support for the factors of production and at the expense of 
the prices of products. The text finally adopted in May 1992 is certainly substantially the original project, 
particularly with regard to the objective of refocusing support on small producers, but the Commission's 
philosophy is partly preserved.  
The CAP reform addresses the problems of the agricultural sector in a holistic way, but it is obviously 
focused on cereals, which play a central role. The logic of the reform is therefore clear and can be 
summarised by the following sequence: - a significant and rapid decline in the price of cereals is 
necessary to regain the internal market, and in particular the most elastic outlet, that of the 'animal 
feed; - this reduction, offset by the offer for cultivated areas by a system of flat-rate aid per hectare, 
should encourage producers to opt for less intensive farming techniques, which should slow down the 
increase in yields, and therefore of the production.  
The reform of the oilseed CMOs is closely linked to that of the CMO cereals, the objective being that 
there is no particular incentive to opt for one production at the expense of another. Support is also 
provided by an aid system. The fall in the price of animal feed should benefit in the first place the 
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production of pigs, poultry and eggs and, to a lesser extent, those of beef, sheep and milk. For these 
three products, the advantage linked to the fall in cereal prices will depend on the rate of incorporation 
of into fall the rations (and the possible decline in the cost of land): the most extensive livestock 
producers will therefore have a lower price benefit from the decrease in the price of cereals. Aid for 
cattle (beef and sheep meat) is therefore modulated according to size criteria (herds) and extensification 
(loading per hectare). The drop in prices of imported ingredients for animal feed, induced by the reform 
itself, should reinforce the drop in livestock costs.  
Finally, the reform does not affect the other sectors (milk), or not at all (sugar), but subsequent 
adjustments are announced. Decisions in May 1992 call into question some of the initial Commission 
proposals. Although the spirit and logic of the initial proposals of the Commission have been maintained, 
the reform adopted in May represents a challenge to some the modalities of the February 1991 and July 
1991 projects, which are more ambitious and more consistent with the long-term objectives of an 
agricultural policy adapted to the requirements of a post-industrial economy. 
In the July 1991 draft, the modulation of aid for cultivated areas disappears. A modulation of the set-
aside compensation is however maintained. The compensation is finally the same for all the frozen 
hectares, whatever the size, in the reform decided last May. In the Commission's proposals, budgeting 
and individual modulation of support income was a major novelty, breaking with the tradition of price 
support. Indeed, one of the paradoxes of these proposals is that they were, in large part, a response to 
the explosion of budgetary costs, but that they led, at least in the short term, to an increase in 
expenditure because from the transfer of the weight of consumer and user support to taxpayers. The 
individual modulation of the aid according to size criteria of farms and herds and loading limits tried to 
remedy this by reducing the budgetary cost of the reform, as well as the inequality of the redistributive 
effects of the CAP. 
While some budgeting of support is maintained in the CAP reform adopted last May, the modulation of 
the latter is practically totally eliminated. More generally, the changes to the Commission's July 1991 
text correspond to attenuations of the original proposals: for cereals, a price reduction of 29% instead of 
35%; for milk, lowering the price of butter by two times 2.5% instead of three times 5%, no decrease in 
the price of the powder, and no predetermined reduction in the quotas; for beef and veal, removal 
under the load conditions threshold of eligibility for premiums of the exclusion(replaced by a capping 
threshold), reinforcement of premium levels and relaxation of payment criteria; payment of premiums 
for corn fodder, etc. These changes should result in a smaller reduction in Community agricultural 
income, but also in increased expenditure. 
In addition, the fixing of base areas for field crops and reference herds by region for beef and sheep 
meat amounts to favouring present producers at the expense of entrants into the industry, and to 
freeze current structures by postponing some number of problems to the future, and in particular that 
of the mobility of these premium rights, which is necessary but insufficiently specified in the reform 
adopted and leaves some issues unresolved. Two main questions, inevitably related, remain: the 
permanence of direct aid amounts and the classification in the GATT of direct aids as decoupled 
instruments or not. The levels of the various direct aids are specified only during the transition phase, 
that is to say until 1997. No information is provided beyond this, and it is not clear whether the aid will 
be indexed to inflation rates, kept fixed in nominal terms or gradually reduced. The latter hypothesis 
would, presumably, make it possible to reach an agreement in the GATT insofar as the direct aid granted 
as compensation for the lowering of prices and the freezing of surfaces could then be placed in the ‘blue 
box’. That is, allowed during the transition phase and then subject to reduction. 
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An initial analysis of the content of the reform certainly leads one to think that it is going in the right 
direction, but also to wonder if it goes far enough. Are the new signals sufficient to guide European 
agriculture towards greater economic efficiency, integrating environmental and spatial concerns and 
towards harmonious international integration? 
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